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Abstract 
In a post-conflict context, reconciliation takes place between the opposite forces, 
and when an ethnic conflict has occurred; reconciliation takes place between the 
opposed ethnic groups. Thus reconciliation is part of a process of decreasing 
ethnic tensions, but not the only important aspect. Rwanda is a least-likely case 
for declined ethnic tensions, due to the brutal genocide in 1994.  
Two aspects of reconciliation are examined: jurisdiction and political 
influence. Gacaca and the ICTR illustrate jurisdiction and representation and 
political history writing exemplify political impact. 
Results of the study implies that gacaca could cause increased ethnic tensions 
in a short perspective, but discovering the truth is crucial for lessened ethnic 
tensions in a long perspective. Moreover, results suggest that a difficult issue for 
ICTR’s success is that the institution is not visible in every-day life. In short, 
lacking diversity on the truth presented in courts is a critical weakness in the 
justice process.   
Political influence, it is implied, has largely been negative in Rwanda because 
of two factors: the attempt to rewrite history in a winners’ perspective and the 
paradox that power is instiuttionalized to Tutsis while all ethic identities are 
banished in public life.  
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1 Introduction 
‘For there can be no healing without peace; there can be no peace without 
justice; and there can be no justice without respect for human rights and the rule 
of law.’ (Annan, 1998, speech on International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
webpage).  
 
These are the words of Kofi Annan in 1998 in his speech about the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). He was closely involved in the mission in 
Rwanda 1993-4, since he was under-secretary general of UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Dallaire, 2005, p.48, 50). The speech was 
presented after the founding of the international tribunal which was dealing with 
one of the worst crimes committed in the 20
th
 century; the genocide in Rwanda. 
The genocide took place in April to June 1994, and caused an astronomical 
amount of deaths and refugees (Blewitt, 2004, p.23; Dansk Institut for 
Internationale Studier, 2004, p.11).
1
 In the peace process after the genocide, 
Rwanda chose the way of justice, and stability in the political life rather than i.e. 
forgiveness and democracy. The aim of this study is to examine what effect these 
choices have had upon one of the issues in a post-genocide country: tensions 
between ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions in Rwanda could be compared to the 
tensions in any other country after an intra-state conflict; tensions between the 
different sides in the conflict are prominent, and the population must find a way of 
living coexisting reasonably peacefully. The reconciliation process between the 
ethnic groups in the country will therefore be studied.   
However, the practical part of the reconciliation process, such as tails, is 
hardly the entire solution for peaceful coexistence; there are other issues, e.g. 
personal security and corruption (Freedomhouse, 2008). Political influence on 
reconciliation and that of jurisdiction which has taken place after the genocide 
will be studied more closely. Reconciliation in a post-conflict society could 
arguably be carried out in different ways, e.g. through a truth-commission, but 
since Rwanda chose justice this is what I will study. 
Firstly, I will clarify the problem of the essay and the method used. Secondly, 
the theories and definitions are presented; thirdly, a historical background is 
presented; and fourthly, political influence is discussed. Lastly, jurisdiction is 
discussed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 The three ethnic groups in Rwanda are: Hutu (84%), Tutsi (15%) and Twa (1%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2008).  
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1.1 Statement of Purpose and Delimitation 
On a general level, the issue is concerned with Rwanda’s reconciliation process 
and more specific; this essay examines two factors more closely, namely 
jurisdiction and political influence upon ethnic identities. Two levels of trials will 
be examined: grass root justice, gacaca, and on the top level, ICTR. Hence, my 
question is as following: 
 
In what way have jurisdiction and political influence had an impact upon 
reconciliation in Rwanda? 
  
As noted above, there are many other factors than politics and jurisdiction that 
may be important for reconciliation, but due to limited space; I have chosen to 
study these factors closely, rather than study many factors superficially. In my 
opinion, this approach is preferable in this case; the idea being that there is 
considerably larger probability of understanding the mechanism behind each 
factor if the number of factors is limited. 
The historical background presented in 3.1 implies that tensions between 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa have been prominent for a long period of time, and could be 
considered as the variable with high ‘fixity’ (Esaiasson, 2007, p.77). The 
reconciliation process in the sense of jurisdiction and political influence on ethnic 
identities are obviously less consistent, and are therefore the ‘alterability’ factor, 
that can affect the situation (ibid).  
Political influence should be crucial for a successful reconciliation process, 
especially in Rwanda, which is an authoritarian regime with limited basic 
freedoms (see part 4.1). Further, it is noteworthy that although the process of 
justice after the conflict is by no means free from political interference; it is not 
per see a political process. The process of rewriting history and of reconstructing 
the people’s identities do, on the other hand, take place within the political arena, 
and therefore will these two processes be discussed in different chapters.  
The time between 2002 and 2008 is the primary period of interest in this study 
due to the fact that after 2002 the situation in Rwanda became more stable (see 
Mgbako, 2005, pp.205-6). However, the years closely following the genocide will 
also be examined, but with the knowledge that the country had not yet obtained 
stability. Moreover, though the genocide itself is interesting, in this essay, the 
conflict will be considered part of the context and hence will be shortly considered 
of that reason. 
1.2 Method and Material 
Rwanda is in many ways an exceptional case; the genocide was an extreme 
conflict; the tension between the ethnic groups was on an extreme level, and 
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hence; the reconciliation process needs to be extremely effective in readapting 
ethnic groups to living side by side again. This extraordinary nature is not 
negative for the ability to generalize the results of the study and possibly apply it 
to other cases, quite on the contrary; an extraordinary case is perfectly useful for 
generalization. Rwanda is a least likely case, in the sense that ethnic tensions are 
least likely to decline in such a severely scarred society (see Esaiasson, 2007, 
pp.183-5). The results of the study are interesting for other cases of reconciliation 
after an intra-state conflict, because causalities seem to be more prominent in 
extreme cases. However, one should obviously be sceptical about the ability to 
generalize results from a case study, but often a case study is the a fruitful 
approach for attaining deep understanding. 
The material used will mostly consist of secondary sources, such as scholarly 
articles and books. Using scholarly articles and books are good in the sense that 
the material often is reliable and well processed; the usual amount of evaluation of 
tendencies and verifying of facts is necessary, that the retelling of a primary 
source in a secondary source could very easily have strong tendencies (ibid.). 
Validity is an important issue for anyone who wishes to produce results that 
are possible to generalize. Moreover, both internal and external validity are 
important, where internal validity involves whether study is consistent in what it 
measures, and external validity is concerned with if the study aims for 
generalization (ibid, pp.175-7). 
Likewise, there is the issue of intermediate variables, for example; let us 
presume that the result of the study implies that justice causes decreased tensions 
(ibid, pp.74-5, 78-9). In that case the question is whether that connection is caused 
simply by the perusing of justice, or if there is an intermediate variable that is not 
part of the study. In order to avoid that problem, when possible, the theoretical 
framework is a good help. Obviously, no theory can be perfect, or applicable to all 
cases, but it is useful for rationalizing the choice of variables and possible causes. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework  
On a general level, the issue of structure versus agency is important for the 
type of answer expected in a study. Although, there is no solution to the issue of 
structure versus agency; this essay will therefore focus upon both actors and 
structures and both will be included in the theoretical framework (Hay, 2002, 
p.91). There is a fine line between study with depth and one so specific that it 
cannot be applied or used in any other case. However, the benefit of this approach 
is that the results could acquire more depth than an analysis containing only one 
factor. In my opinion, a full analysis is crucial for the quality of an essay and 
worth prioritizing. 
Theories that will be used in the essay are following: reconciliation and 
ethnicity. For reconciliation the theoretical framework will mainly contain Telling 
the Truths (2006) and Donald L Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) 
concerning ethnicity. Horowitz is plausible for a general view on political life; the 
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regime’s motives for its stand point on ethnicity, and on the organization of the 
political life. 
It is important to note that the success of the reconciliation process will not be 
measured on a scale, because, there is no good measurement or quantitative 
variable such as there is one for e.g. voters’ confidence in the ruling government. 
The tension between the ethnic groups in the country is a very complex variable, 
and at the present time difficult to measure in numbers.   
  6 
2 Theoretical Framework 
The theories constituting the theoretical framework will be presented; first those 
on ethnicity, and secondly those on reconciliation. 
2.1 Ethnicity 
The concept of ethnicity is not unproblematic to define. There are many different 
cues for ethnicity; in some cases it is religion, in others visible cues such as skin 
colour or clothing and in others phenotype (see Horowitz, 1985, pp.44-52). No 
matter what the groups are distinguished by, one could be almost certain that most 
members regard their group authentic. Hence, the only reasonable approach is to 
consider all cues legitimate. Donald L. Horowitz’s definition is, in my opinion, 
the most fruitful: ‘[e]thnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which 
usually carries with it traits believed to be innate’ (ibid, p.52). The ‘myth of 
collective ancestry’ is especially useful, because it emphasizes a crucial point; a 
somewhat postmodernist approach is necessary in the case of Rwanda, where the 
most visible (see Horowitz, 1985, p.52; Melvern, 2000, p.61). 
There is a great difference between hierarchical ordering (ranked groups) and 
parallel ordering (unranked groups) Horowitz, 1985, p.22). In a hierarchical 
ordering there is a superordinate group and one or of more subordinate groups 
(ibid.). A parallel system contains groups where there ethnicity and social class do 
not co-vary, i.e. no group is clearly subordinate and another superordinate (ibid.). 
In countries with clear ethnical boundaries ethnicity is frequently prominent in 
the political organizational life, and virtually all political events have ethnic 
consequences (Horowitz, 1985, p. 9-12). However, it is important to note that 
politics is not even in the most separated countries only reduced to simply 
ethnicity (ibid, p.7). 
One problematic issue with an ethnically ordered political system is that the 
party system tends to be stable; for a non ethnic or multiethnic party to gain power 
in an ethnically based system is not easy (ibid, p.340). Therefore, the situation 
could be described as a catch-22; it is difficult, though not impossible to open up 
such a system. 
Moreover, according to Horowitz, multiplying the numbers of ethnic based 
parties is not the solution; then there will be parties that more radical than if there 
is only one per group (1985, p.359). 
Hence, ethnic party systems tend to aggravate conflicts, because the stakes are 
always high in elections, and which also induces great impulses toward change 
(Horowitz, 1985, p.349). 
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There are, obviously, many other reasons for conflicts between ethnic groups 
to occur, e.g. economic reasons or different levels of modernization (see 
Horowitz, 1985, pp. 105-35). This study is mainly concerned with politics and 
reconciliation, and therefore only the aspects usable for these areas will be 
discussed. 
2.2 Reconciliation 
What reconciliation practically involves and how it should  be carried out is a 
debatable question; should reconciliation take place through ‘pardon’, 
‘punishment’, or even through ‘amnesia’ (see Graybill, 2004, p.1117)? Firstly, a 
definition of reconciliation will be presented and secondly; political reconciliation 
will be discussed. 
The definition of reconciliation used in this essay can be summed up as 
following: “a satisfactory way of dealing with opposing facts and ideas” (Oxford 
Concise Dictionary, in Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.67). Thus, reconciliation is a rather 
modest idea, and preliminary getting opposing parts to speak to each other might 
be good beginning (ibid). Often, the formal resolution of a conflict is only the first 
step toward peaceful coexistence, because after a conflict the groups lives tend to 
be interlocked (Cairns et al, 2005 p.461). A reconciliation process should include 
following elements: (1) reconciliation need not include forgiveness; (2) 
reconciliation interrupts an established pattern of events; (3) reconciliation is 
about memory; (4) reconciliation involves acknowledgement of the truth; (5) 
reconciliation entails understanding; (5) reconciliation is a process; (6) 
reconciliation requires time and space for mourning, and hurt, as well as healing; 
(7) reconciliation includes reparations (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, pp.69-74). 
As Graybill points out; ‘punishment’ is the reconciliation path that Rwanda 
chose, because of that; the theoretical framework will mainly be concerned with 
justice (see Graybill, 2004, p.1117). In the political arena, justice and 
reconciliation seems to be interconnected concepts, because reconciliation does 
not necessarily include forgiveness, but justice is often the only realistic way to 
achieve reconciliation (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.60). Moreover, Villa-Vicencio 
argues that reconciliation is not a utopian ideal, but grim reality and politicians 
should neither be priests nor psychologists, because in the best of circumstances, 
political reconciliation can be a dialogue (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.61). Only the 
victims can, after all, conduct forgiveness, not solely the politicians (ibid.). In 
short: ‘[p]olitical reconciliation necessarily needs to be deeply vertical and 
extensively horizontal’ (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.66). 
On a personal level, reconciliation in the victims’ point of view, involves 
overcoming the negative power that the perpetrator has over their lives (Peterson 
Amour – Umbreit, 2005, p.492). From offenders’ viewpoint, reconciliation can 
result in a feeling of being accepted by the community (Cairns, 2005, p.493). 
Finally; it is not productive to dwell on the past, but neither should one 
proceed without dealing with it (ibid, p.472f). 
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2.2.1 Victims and Perpetrators 
In principle, the definition of perpetrators and victims does not seem too 
complicated. A victim is someone who is exposed to any hardship, while a 
perpetrator is someone who committed something, especially a crime (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 1989a, 1989b). 
In reality, especially during genocide, it is more complicated to define people 
simply as perpetrators or victims. Many are both victims and perpetrators: i.e. 
they could both have committed crimes and been exposed to crimes, or perhaps 
have worked with the ‘right’ side for a while and the ‘wrong’ side for a while 
(Graybill, 2004, pp.21-2). Should these people be regarded as victims or 
perpetrators? Moreover, there were many child soldiers during the genocide who 
committed ghastly crimes, but still were victims in the sense that they were 
manipulated or forced to join the military forces (ibid). Are they victims or 
perpetrators? Should the child soldiers be prosecuted for the crimes they 
committed as minors? 
The definition of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ is a highly political question 
indeed, probably even more so due to that Tutsi, who generally were most likely 
to get killed, nowadays are in power (see Graybill, 2004, p.21).  For example, in 
Rwanda crimes committed by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers against 
Interahamwe
2
 and defeated Rwandan Governmental Forces (RGF) are ignored to 
a larger extent than those committed by Hutu forces (Burnet, 2007, p.17). 
Moreover, Tutsi has got the monopoly on the ‘victim’ status, which not only is 
problematic; it also wrong. 
 That definition of Tutsi as ‘victims’ and Hutu as ‘perpetrators’ is problematic 
since it is crucial that those who have reason to feel like victims should have the 
right to justice; Hutus were also victims and moreover; the Tutsi side of the 
conflict committed crimes as well as the Hutu side (Corey - Joireman, 2004, 
pp.87-8). It is crucial to acknowledge all victims if reconciliation is to be 
achieved. 
The notion of perpetrators and victims used in this study is wider than the 
Tutsi – Hutu based definition of the regime. However, this stated, often the same 
notion will be reduced into that definition when courts are discussed. This is 
mainly made for convenience; those accused are described as possible 
perpetrators, while the opposite side is possible victims. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2  Hutu militia (NE.se, 2009).  
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3 Historical Background 
Many of the factors resulting in ethnic tensions in post-genocide Rwanda are 
deeply rooted in history. The success of the reconciliation process is obviously 
connected to the notion of ethnicity and ethnic tensions. Due to that the issue of 
ethnicity and ethnic tensions is deeply rooted in history; it is crucial to present an 
overview of Rwanda’s past from the first colonizers arrived until the genocide 
1994. The period of time described will be roughly divided into three epochs, and 
will be presented in following order: Pre-Colonial and Colonial Rwanda, 
Independence, and Genocide. 
3.1 Pre-Colonial and Colonial Rwanda 
Little is known about Rwanda’s pre-colonization history; there are no written 
sources (Melvern, 2000, p.7). Two facts, however, are reasonably certain: Rwanda 
was a well-organized kingdom; and Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were already considered 
diverse groups
3
 (see Melvern, 2000, pp. 7f). 
Twa are the aboriginal people of Rwanda, and likewise Hutu and Tutsi; Twa 
lived scattered in the country with no principal area of residence (ibid, p.8). Hutu 
were regarded as shorter and stouter than Tutsis (ibid.). The theory is that Tutsi 
probably immigrated to Rwanda last of the groups. Hutus probably came first and 
became farmers, and Tutsis came later and were herds (ibid.7-8). Tutsi were the 
ruling class due to their mobility as herds, and Hutus were often bound to them by 
a feudal system (ibid, p.8f). Hutu, Tutsi and Twa all possess the single 
characteristic which extinguishes ethnic groups according to Horowitz: myth of a 
collective ancestry (Horowitz, 1985, p.52). Furthermore, it was a hierarchical 
system; due to that Tutsi was the superordinate group (Horowitz, 1985, p.22). 
Rwanda was assigned to Germany during the Berlin Conference in 1885, and 
ruled the country through existing power structure until World War 1 (Melvern, 
2000, p.7, 9). 
After Germany lost the war, Rwanda got assigned to Belgium who controlled 
the country using opposed ruling technique; they rules directly and allied with 
Tutsis, who got the administrative power (ibid, p.9). Moreover, they emphasized 
the ethnicity of the groups by classifying all citizens as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 There is no general agreement on whether or not Hutu and Tutsi were considered as separate ethnic groups see 
e.g. Melvern, 2000, p.8: Mgbako, 2005, p.204.  
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conveniently put it down on compulsory id-cards (ibid, p.10). Shortly before 
Rwanda’s independence, Belgium switched allies to Hutu (ibid.). 
3.2 Independence 
Rwanda gained its independence in 1961, after a Hutu rebellion in 1959 which 
overthrew the Tutsi monarchy (Freedomhouse, 2008). The rebellion reversed the 
power structure and a vast number of Tutsis fled to neighbour countries where 
they largely were marginalized (Mgbako, 2005, p.204). During the forthcoming 
decades, the Tutsi population was oppressed by many different means (Melvern 
2000, p. 20; Mgbako, 2005, p.204). 
During those first decades of independence: Rwanda was not too stable, nor 
was it immensely democratic; MRND was the only legal party between 1975 and 
1990 (Paris, 2004, p.70f). 
The Tutsi refugees in neighbour countries longed back to Rwanda, so they 
formed the rebel army Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and tried to seize power 
(Mgbako, 2005, p.204). Rwanda was attacked by RPF during 1990-3 from its 
neighbouring countries (Paris, 2004, p.70). The Arusha Accords was signed in 
August 1993, after pressure from the international community (Melvern, 2000, 
pp.52f). 
3.3 Genocide 
After the Arusha Accords, the situation in Rwanda was very tense. Now, it was up 
to the regime and RPF to implement the agreement with assistance of UN 
peacekeepers (Paris, 2004, pp.70-2). 
However, in April 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane crashed which was 
the beginning of the 100 days genocide, and within the next day and a half the 
frenzy had spread trough the rest of the country (Paris, 2004, p.73). Local Hutu 
militia and ordinary Hutus continued murdering their neighbours with whatever 
they had at hand, and all in a carefully planned operation (ibid.). UN peacekeepers 
could do little; they were few and with a chapter six mandate, which resulted in 
that they could use violence only in self-defence (Dallaire, 2005, p.43). It was not 
until RPF gained control of country that the mass murder stopped (Paris, 2004, 
pp.71, 74). 
The genocide had many causes, but the main reason was probably a last effort 
by Hutu extremists to remain in power and prevent the Arusha Accords from 
being implemented (Paris, 2004, p.74). Other causes were fear of democracy, the 
bad economic situation, and largely Rwanda’s colonial heritage (ibid, p.75). 
An astonishing 800.000-1 million people were murdered and a minimum of 2 
million refugees were the result of the genocide (Paris, 2004, p.73). These 
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numbers do, however, vary somewhat depending upon source, but those presented 
above most commonly occur. In this essay, the exact amount of deaths or refugees 
is not of great importance, and of that reason; these numbers will be used. 
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4 Political Impact on Reconciliation   
Rwanda is not a democracy, because ironically after circa thirty years of Hutu 
dominance, and frequent oppression of Tutsis; RPF gained power in Rwanda and 
founded a one-party state dominated by Tutsi (see Reyntjens, 2004, p.188; 
Mgbako, 2005, pp.206-7). Moreover, there are few and no powerful opposition 
parties in Rwanda, due to that they were driven into exile (Reyntjens, 2004, 
pp.191-2). This study will of that reason focus upon the RPF, since it is the single 
most important political actor in the country. 
The largest oppositional party Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) is 
Hutu-based and was banned in 2003 and other oppositional parties were also de 
facto prohibited until 2007, when the ban on political offices on the local arena 
was lifted (ibid.). 
Despite the mere fact that Tutsis are dominating the political arena; this part 
the study is concerned with political influence on ethnic identities and the 
reconciliation process in the country.  
In this part, political impact on reconciliation will be discussed; first the 
political impact on ethnic identities and secondly the political impact on official 
history writing. 
4.1 Representativeness, Representation in Parliament 
and Government and the Paradox of Absent Ethnic 
Identities  
“Generally, the people who have been excluded or underrepresented are great 
partners for change […] that usually means women.” (Inter-Parliamentary Union 
in Whitman, 2005, p.106).  
 
In the Rwandan case it includes both women and Hutu, who have been 
underrepresented since RPF seized power. However, the representation of Hutu is 
more important for the issue of this study, namely ethnic tensions. Therefore, 
Hutu representation is in focus in this part of the essay. The notion of 
representativeness as presented on Rwanda’s Government homepage; includes 
that all groups and parts of the country are present in the Government (Rwanda’s 
Government Homepage, 2008a). Equal representation is a rather paradoxical 
statement coming from a government which at the same time denies the existence 
of ethnic groups. This issue pin-points the problematic part in Rwanda’s 
reconciliation and decreasing ethnic tensions: the presence and equally denial of 
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the ethnic relations which pervades the entire country. This issue will be briefly 
presented below and more thoroughly discussed in 4.2. 
While Rwanda is not a democratic country, presentation in the parliament and 
the government still indicates the regime’s position in the issue of equality. If the 
government really aims to reconcile the groups; then it is preferable if it is visible 
in how they compose their own representatives. 
Tutsization
4
 has paradoxically occurred during the period that the Government 
claimed that there are no ethnic groups in Rwanda. The process involves 
consolidating power to the small Tutsi elite, that most of the leading RPF 
politicians belong to (Reyntjens, 2004, pp.187-8). 
However, after the election 2003, Hutus inhabit 15 of 29 governmental 
positions and moreover 13 of 18 ministerial posts to Hutus (Reyntjens, 2004, 
p.187). Since RPF started as a Tutsi movement, it might be a sign that the 
Government actually intends to live up to their own vision of representativeness 
(see Reyntjens, 2004, p.187; Rwanda’s Government Homepage, 2008a). 
4.2  Rewriting History 
Rewriting history is an important factor in the government’s policy for preventing 
future genocides and they have done so in several ways which will be presented 
here: the rewriting of history, the ingando camps and the banning genocide 
ideology. 
Regarding rewriting history, it is mainly the history of the definition of and 
relations between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa that is being rewritten. As discussed in 
3.1.1, there is no consensus on how Hutu, Tutsi and Twa started being regarded as 
diverse (ethnic) groups. The intermediate position taken by the author is that there 
are indications on that the groups were regarded as diverse groups in the pre-
colonial era, but that the colonial powers made the division worse by using the 
divide and conquer approach (see Melvern, 2000, pp.8-11). RPF, the present 
government, is using the genocide to gain legitimacy for its rule (Hintjens, 2008, 
pp.11-2). Corey and Joireman pin-point one crucial problem with the regime’s 
performing of justice: ‘[c]rimes in both cases need to be attributed to individuals, 
not ethnic groups’ (Corey – Joireman, 2004, 89). The ignoring of crimes 
committed by RPF and Tutsis in general could be a big issue in the future, which 
could contribute to long-time decline of ethnic groups. 
Rewriting history about the colonial past and the genocide is one of the ways 
in which the RPF has tried to prevent future genocide (Hintjens, 2008, p.10). 
‘Rwanda has had a troubled past caused by internal division. It all began when the 
colonial administration divided the society along ethnic lines in order to weaken it 
and thereby make its dominance possible’ (Rwandan’s Government Homepage, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 A process where while the existence of ethnic identities are officially denied, but the political power is 
institutionalized to Tutsis (see Reyntjens, 2004, p.187).   
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2008a). The official view is clear; the problems are the colonizers fault, before 
colonization ethnic tension did not exist. A result of this starting-point is that all 
ethnic identities are banished from the political arena and as shown above, neither 
are ethnic groups acknowledged to exist (Freedomhouse, 2008). 
The Government claimed that the relationship between the groups was 
‘symbolic’ and class based rather than ethnic (Rwanda’s Government homepage, 
2008b). Therefore, the regime’s view is that the 1994 genocide can be directly 
traced back to the European colonizers and their rather racial ideology (ibid.). 
The general idea of ingando
5
 camps when they started in 1996 was that they 
should be an institution where ex-soldiers and Tutsi returnees are sent for re-
education before integrating them in their home villages or towns (Mgbako, 2005, 
p.208). RPF who started the camps claimed that they have roots in history, and 
they made it out as a modified version of Rwandan tradition which few others, 
independent, sources suggest (see Mgbako, 2005, p.208). Basically, the aim of the 
ingando camps is to present the official version of history and ideology to the 
citizens (Mgbako, 2005, p.209). Although the regime calls it ‘public education’ 
indoctrination would probably be a more fitting term (see Rwanda’s Government, 
2008b). Ingando camps were also constructed to various other groups: e.g. 
university students, gacaca judges and genocidaires (Mgbako, 2005, p.209). 
Since 2003, ‘ethnic ideology’, ‘genocide mentality’ and ‘divisionism’ have all 
been banned in Rwanda (Mgbako, 2005, p.208). The government presents the ban 
as a crucial step to preserve the country against future genocide (ibid.). In practice 
this ban tends to involve anyone criticizing the regime or, anyone disfavoured by 
the regime (Hintjens, 2008, p.10). 
Hintjens argues that rewriting history the very ruthless way the present regime 
have done is problematic because inevitably; it puts focus on the genocide and 
could paradoxically prevent reconciliation from taking place (Hintjens, 2008, 
p.32). 
4.3 Analysis 
In this part, possible political influence on the ethnic tensions and the 
reconciliation process will be examined. I will begin by applying Horowitz’s 
theory on ethnicity and politics on the Rwandan case, and thereafter continue by 
applying six Villa-Vicencio’s seven criteria for reconciliation. 
The ethnic system in Rwanda seems to always have been hierarchal: first, 
during the colonial period, Tutsi was the superordinate group. After the 1959 
coup, the order changed and Hutu raised them selves in the hierarchy until they 
became the superordinate group and continued to inhibit that post until the 
genocide (Melvern, 2000, pp.8-10, 13-4; Paris, 2004, p.70). According to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Ingando: rehabilitation camps for e.g. soldiers or returning Tutsis which was started by RPF (Mgbako, 2005, 
pp.208-9). 
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Horowitz, that Hutu should have produced the change in the system is expectable, 
because it is most likely in a hieratical system that the subordinate group induces 
change. 
After the genocide, Tutsi became the de facto superordinate group, but the 
system is somewhat less static now (Paris, 2004, 74). This strengthens Horowitz’s 
thesis that if the system is to change, it is usually the subordinate group which 
produces the change (Horowitz, 1985, p.32). 
The problem with the Rwandan system at the present is that it is a hierarchal 
system pretending to be parallel. In Rwanda a change number (3) has occurred; 
the subordinate group aim at raising themselves in the hierarchy (see Horowitz, 
1985, p.34). The elite pretend that the change occurred is a number (4); that the 
system becomes unranked (ibid.). If the Hutu part of the population realise they 
are being fooled; the instability of the system might increase. However, that Hutus 
are included in the cabinet could actually be a good sign, even if it is mostly on a 
symbolic level. 
Moreover, it is problematic that hierarchal systems tend to involve a catch-22: 
party systems are usually stable in hierarchal systems, which is problem if one 
agrees on that the RPF is contra productive in decreasing ethnic tensions. Neither 
is multiplying the numbers of ethnic parties the solution, because it tends to 
produce more radical parties (Horowitz, 1985, p.359). 
Now over to reconciliation and Villa-Vicencio’s minimum definition of 
reconciliation in politics: “a satisfactory way of dealing with opposing facts and 
ideas” (Oxford Concise Dictionary, in Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.67). The problem 
in the Rwandan case is that the regime does not plan to deal with opposing facts 
and ideas. Instead, the RPF bans opposition parties and harasses freethinkers and 
other independent intellectuals (Freedomhouse, 2008). Although there has been a 
slight ease on the ban in 2003; in practice RPF is still the only powerful party. It is 
their version of the truth that is hegemonic, which is problematic if reconciliation 
involves finding satisfactory ways of dealing with opposing facts and ideas. 
Moreover, Villa-Vicencio’s third and forth criteria are connected to this issue: 
reconciliation is about memory and reconciliation involves acknowledgement of 
the truth (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, pp.70-1). Simple memory of the event does not 
necessarily involve remembering the truth. If the collective memory of the 
something as crucial as genocide is manipulated, which it has been in Rwanda; 
then there are chances that it could be manipulated for contra-productive causes. 
Obviously, RPF is manipulating the truth and collective memory in order to gain 
legitimacy and claim the necessity of their staying in power. In their history 
writing, there is little focus on crimes committed by the RPF side before and after 
the genocide (see Rwanda’s Government homepage, 2008b). Ingando camps do 
have the purpose of promoting RPF’s view on the genocide and history before 
that: shortly that everything can be blamed on the colonial powers and that there 
are no ethnic groups in Rwanda (Mgbako, 2005, p.209). In short, the regime is 
trying to reverse the ‘myth of collective ancestry’ by the claim that Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa are creations of the colonial powers (see Horowitz, 1985, p.52). If the 
attempt is successful; it could change the future of Rwanda forever. However, 
scholarly research implies that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were distinct groups even 
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before colonization, which suggests that ethnic identities probably are more 
difficult to extinguish than some political propaganda can accomplish (Melvern, 
2000, pp.8-9). Moreover, the issue is even more complicated due to the paradox 
of Tutsization and the absence of ethnic identities. This paradox ought to have a 
negative effect on reconciliation and ethnic identities because of the fact that the 
Hutu population can feel cheated if there in the official propaganda are no ethnic 
groups but at the same time all the political power is consolidated to Tutsis. If 
forcing away ethnic identity would work; it would hardly work if the political 
elite do not work as a role model for the rest of the population. 
As far as the third criterion, memory is concerned: forgetting is not an 
alternative in Rwanda. On the other hand: there are several ways of remembering, 
and the current history writing is not perfectly suited for preserving everyone’s 
memories of the event.  
However, both ICTR and gacaca are political initiatives for acknowledging 
the truth. They are not unproblematic, due to that they present a certain view of 
the truth, but might be the only alternative, and of that reason; it is difficult to 
judge them too hard. 
Villa-Vicencio’s first criterion is reconciliation does not necessarily involve 
forgiveness (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.69). In Rwanda, it seems as though the 
political elite both wants forgiveness and does not want forgiveness. They aim for 
forgiveness in the sense that gacaca are supposed to contribute to reconciliation, 
and moreover; the official propaganda promoting unity. At the same time, the 
regime still does not want forgiveness; the banning of ‘genocide ideology’ is an 
implication on that. It implies that that the regime does not consider forgiveness 
very probable. 
The second criterion Villa-Vicencio suggests is that reconciliation interrupts 
and established pattern of event (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.69). If as in the case of 
Rwanda, the established pattern of event is ethnic tensions; in that case the regime 
both have succeeded and not succeeded in interrupting it. They have succeeded in 
the sense that they are currently trying to exterminate ethnic identities and the 
gacaca courts which supposedly contributes to reconciliation. The regime has not 
succeeded in due to that these attempts have not been tremendously successful; 
sometimes gacaca courts seemed to increase ethnic tensions after a trial. 
However, that tensions have increased in some cases in the aftermath of the courts 
work should not be taken too seriously; perhaps that temporary alteration is 
unavoidable if the tensions are to reach a reasonably stable low level. 
Reconciliation requires reparation is the seventh criterion Villa-Vicencio 
suggests (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.74). If reparation involves restoring the 
relationship between those involved in the conflict, then Rwanda understandably 
has a long way to go. Ingando camps and political aims at representativeness are a 
start, but as long as Rwanda is not a democracy Hutu and Tutsi are not going to be 
on equal terms. This is of course unless RPF becomes a fully multiethnic party, 
which is unlikely because RPF was founded among the Tutsi diaspora in 
neighbour countries. Therefore, it seems unlikely that RPF would give up the 
Tutsi orientation totally. 
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However, there are of course problems with democracy as well; Horowitz 
mentions that it is very difficult to solve the problem of for example a 60% - 40% 
division (Horowitz, 1985, p.650). There are reasons to believe that if Rwanda was 
to democratize; Tutsi could get a weaker position which they might not accept, 
and the possibility of harassment against them is not possible to exclude. 
Lastly, it is important to remember Villa-Vicencio’s fifth  criterion: 
reconciliation is a process (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, pp.72-3). In the light of the 
hideous crimes committed during the genocide; it is not surprising that Rwanda’s 
population does not live fully peaceful together fourteen years afterwards. 
In conclusion: the political measures to decrease and abolish ethnic tensions 
have worked in the sense that ethnic violence is less prominent now than after the 
genocide, but those measures are probably not the preferable for sustainable 
peace. 
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5 Justice and Reconciliation 
A reconciliation process is always complex, but in an extreme case such as 
Rwanda the process is even more complex. Due to that Hutu and Tutsi live in the 
same villages and cities; reconciliation is the only reasonable way forward. Justice 
is one way to achieve reconciliation, and, as stated above, Rwanda chose that 
concept and therefore justice will be the main focus (see Graybill, 2004, pp.1120-
4). First, the international court, ICTR, will be described, and secondly, the grass 
root courts, gacaca, are presented. 
5.1 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The ICTR was approved of by UN’s Security Council in November 1994, in order 
to prosecute those who organized the 1994 genocide, and in any cases concerned 
with International Humanitarian Law (ICTR, 2008b). An international tribunal 
was particularly necessary in Rwanda’s case; the elite was the first target in the 
genocide and because of that a vast number of judges and solicitors had fled the 
country or been killed (Messell, 2004, p.95). Thus, the Rwandan state simply did 
not have the capacity of prosecuting all suspects, and the idea was that 
prosecuting the main organizers would be a symbolic gesture (see Rwanda’s 
Government homepage, 2008b). 
The Security Council approved of the tribunal in November 1994 by 
Resolution 955, and somewhat later it was decided that it should be located in 
Arusha, Tanzania (ICTR, 2008b). 
The tribunal has three chambers with seven judges each, resulting in that three 
trials can be ongoing at the same time (ibid). Only individuals are prosecuted and 
so far the ICTR has secured more than 70 persons suspected for acts of genocide 
(ibid). The final date for the tribunal is 2008; when it has worked for fourteen 
years (Messell, 2004, p.96). Statistics from the 10
th
 of October 2008 show that 37 
of the total 74 detainees have received their judgment (see ICTR 2008a). 
Moreover, 33 cases have been rendered, and a few detainees are waiting for trial 
(ICTR, 2008a). 
According to the organization itself, ICTR has since 1995 acquired following:  
secured the arrest of 70 suspects, completed trials of several suspects, established 
legal principles for other international criminal tribunals in the world, founded a 
complex international institution, pioneered in the advocacy of witnesses (ICTR, 
2008). Erik Møse, judge of ICTR, adds that the ICTR has increased Rwandan 
political leaders’ accountability since many of the accused were part of the elite 
and would probably not have been charged without the ICTR (Møse, 2005, 
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p.932). Moreover, Møse argues that fair and impartial trials are another important 
achievement which could be difficult to conduct in Rwanda (Møse, 2005, p.933). 
However, Møse also points at one key weakness with the tribunal: it had an 
insufficient number of judges to handle the vast number of suspects (ibid. p.928).  
    Nsanzuwera, like Møse an ICTR judge, adds to the list that by prosecuting the 
suspects and admitting that the 1994 frenzy indeed was a genocide; ICTR gave 
the victims their dignity back and showed that not even the elite is above the law 
(Nsanzuwera, 2005, p.946). 
5.2 Gacaca Courts 
Gacaca courts conduct justice on grass root level in post-genocide Rwanda and 
they are specifically concerned with crimes of genocide. The gacaca courts were 
constructed by the government as the lowest level in the legal system where the 
least serious crimes are dealt with (Sarkin, 2001, p.159). 
They are an attempt to conduct justice to those involved in the genocide, as 
well as a way of releasing some pressure from over-crowded prisons and 
jurisdiction (Corey – Joireman, 2004, p.82). The modern gacaca were launched in 
2002, and were supposed to finish 2007, but the mandate was extended to 2008 
(Amnesty International, 2008, p.253). After establishing this system, circa 40.000 
prisoners were either sent directly home, or underwent reintegration in ingando 
camps first. There are, as mentioned before, still few trained judges and solicitors 
left in Rwanda, which undoubtedly makes the legal process more difficult (Sarkin, 
2001, p.158). Moreover, the post-genocide legal system is dominated by Tutsi, 
and experienced Hutu judges or solicitors are occasionally excluded (ibid.). 
Although Jeremy Sarkin’s article was published 2001; there are few indications 
on that this would have changed since the ruling elite still is predominately Tutsi, 
and represent Tutsi interests (see e.g. Reyntjens, 2004, pp.187-8). 
Gacaca was a pre-colonial part of Rwandan village life; it was a voluntary 
institution where the village elders discussed and helped solving the community’s 
conflicts, for those who wished (Sarkin, 2001, p.159). The difference today is that 
it is compulsory, and the fact that the modern gacaca version are concerned with 
murders (ibid.). 
In October 2001 the elections were held, and approximately 255,000 judges 
were elected (Corey – Joireman, 2004, p.83). The election are held in the 
communities, but they are not entirely up to the communities preferences because 
both Hutus and Tutsis must be chosen, and discrimination against people due to 
religion, sex, ethnicity and other reasons is not allowed (Sarkin, 2001, p.162). 
These requests in themselves are contradictory, because assuring both Hutus and 
Tutsis among the judges can certainly involve discrimination of the majority. The 
outcome of the elections seems to reflect to power balance in the area (ibid.). A 
possible result of this is that gacaca sentences also could depend on whether there 
are many Hutus or Tutsis represented among the judges (see Sarkin, 2001, p.161). 
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True or not, the suspicion of political tendencies is bad enough in itself to 
undermine accountability of the gacaca system (ibid). 
During the court sessions, the village people are allowed to watch and 
participate with comments and testimonies, which supposedly contribute to 
reconciliation in the village (Corey – Joireman, 2004, p.84). 
One of the weaker points of the gacaca system is that only crimes carried out 
during 1990-1994 are treated, and no accusations of RPF soldiers, or Tutsis in 
general either; those are supposed to be dealt with in ordinary courts (Corey – 
Joireman, 2004, p.87). 
Another point the gacaca system has been criticized for is that the 
prosecutions often are based on hearsay and that the legal standard is low (see 
Whitman, 2005, p.104-5; Bosire, 2006, p.10). 
One of the aims of the gacaca law, which was adopted in 2001, was to 
promote suspects of genocide to confess (Molenaar, 2005, p.54). Gacaca sessions 
are the forum where prisoners present their confessions and if they do, among 
other benefits; the prisoners can get reduced sentences and even amnesty (ibid, 
pp.53-5, 147). In that aim, they have succeeded, because the percentage of 
prisoners that confessed have abruptly increased after the law was passed (ibid, 
p.54-5). If the quality and sincerity of the confessions are low; the use could be 
doubted (Molenaar, 2005, p.141). 
In short, the greatest weakness with the gacaca courts is that they could 
actually prevent the reconciliation process. On the other hand, the main strength is 
that is conducts a manageable system for bringing justice to most of the victims of 
the genocide. 
5.3 Analysis 
If reconciliation is to be able to deal with opposing ideas and facts (see 2.2), then 
in Rwanda it could be a difficult task indeed. In this part, the theories on 
reconciliation will be applied to the ICTR and gacaca as part of the reconciliation 
process. Villa-Vicencio’s criteria are below used for an analysis of justice as a 
way to achieve. 
The first factor is following: reconciliation does not necessarily involve 
forgiveness (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.69). The traditional version of gacaca is to 
restore harmony into the community, and in that manner gacaca is concerned 
reconciliation, but not necessarily forgiveness. Social harmony could include 
forgiveness, but it could also solely imply acceptance. ICTR also has the aim of 
contributing to reconciliation in the country (ICTR, 2008a). However, the tribunal 
is not concerned with forgiveness; their idea of reconciliation involves punishment 
for those who committed crimes against Humanitarian Law and those who 
organized the genocide. A reasonable guess is that the idea behind conducting 
justice was that highlighting that crimes against Humanitarian Law are not 
acceptable. 
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For a reconciliation process to be successful, it should interrupt an established 
pattern of events (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.69). Justice in Rwanda could be a way 
of interrupting established patterns, because historically none have been 
prosecuted for the mass killings committed against the Tutsi population in before 
1994. Both ICTR and gacaca are good initiatives in that sense, since they do 
change the structure. In a longer perspective, it seems reasonable that if these 
trials are successful; the structure that creates ethnic tensions could be diminished. 
That reconciliation involves memory is a rather obvious function of gacaca 
trials. They are, as stated above, not about punishment as much as they are 
concerned with truth-telling. ICTR is more of a traditional court; their goal is to 
achieve reconciliation by bringing justice to the victims. 
Villa-Vicencio’s third criterion is that reconciliation involves 
acknowledgement of the truth, (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.71). If that is the case, 
then justice in general, and ICTR and gacaca in particular are positive forces 
promoting reconciliation. In this manner gacaca courts are promoting 
reconciliation, if it was not for the fact that everyone is not allowed be a victim 
and be heard. This issue is interconnected to the problem of who should be 
considered a victim or a perpetrator. Those who were unfortunate enough to not 
being a victim in the eyes of the gacaca system, or have been violated by RPF 
forces, have a harder time acquiring justice (see Corey – Joireman, 2004, pp.87-
8). 
Moreover, confessions, even if they are promoted by the regime, could 
contribute to reconciliation in this criterion. If those who confess also recognize 
the victims’ pain, caused by them; confessions can truly contribute to 
reconciliation (Molenaar, 2005, p.142). 
Whether reconciliation entails understanding in these formal institutions is 
difficult to tell. The regime promotes gacaca as a tool to enable understanding, 
but worrying enough; it seems as if anyone having the unfortunate of getting the 
wrong judge, the result could be increased ethnic tensions and harassment instead 
(Brounéus, 2008, pp.71-2). Once again; ICTR is a more formal tribunal where the 
aim is not to produce understanding between those concerned with the trial itself, 
but rather to entail understanding between the different sides in the conflict on a 
more general level. It is difficult to tell if they have been successful, but truth is 
that ICTR is not as visible in Rwandan media as it ought to be, if the public in 
general is to achieve knowledge of the happening in the tribunal. Fact that it is not 
situated in Rwanda does naturally make it harder for the ICTR to be visible in 
Rwandan public life. Moreover, the fact that the regime has good control of the 
media is not positive for ICTR’s visibility, because at times the regime has been 
rather hostile toward the tribunal. 
That reconciliation is a process is highlighted by the fact that gacaca were 
active during five years and fourteen for ICTR. However, not even fourteen years 
is enough times for reconciliation; for those whose family and friends were 
murdered generations might be a better period of time to aim if total reconciliation 
is to be achieved. Reconciliation can therefore not solely take place though 
justice, but it could be a good start. The crucial point at this stage of the post-
conflict period is probably not to aim for total reconciliation, but rather to find 
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some minimum level at which the population can find it acceptable to live 
together again. 
The ICTR and gacaca are complementary institutions for bringing justice, not 
opposing approaches. It would, of course, not be possible, nor really desirable, to 
prosecute all suspects of acts of genocide in a tribunal such as ICTR; the cases 
very complicated and the evidence extensive, and hence; each case is more time-
consuming than would be necessary for less complicated cases. Gacaca is a 
system with great problems, but the positive part is that it is possible to implement 
in societies as Rwanda with very limited resources. 
It is interesting to note that the choice of Arusha as location for ICTR is highly 
symbolic; the Arusha Accords, which UN fundamentally failed to implement, 
were produced there. It is questionable whether it is wise to put the criminal court 
in the city where the international community fundamentally failed at protecting 
the people of Rwanda. However; it puts a large amount of pressure on the ICTR to 
be successful. 
Gacaca courts have got much critique, e.g. for that they should increase 
tensions between Hutu and Tutsi in during and after trials, when all the misdeeds 
are brought to surface again. However, it is very important to deal with the 
traumas of the past, if nothing else; then to at least have the chance of voicing 
them in public. Perhaps increased tension are necessary if everyone concerned are 
to move on, and maybe increased tensions in a short perspective is crucial if they 
are to decrease in a longer perspective. Though gacaca is hardly a perfectly 
preformed; the process in itself is important for surfacing the tensions (African 
Rights, 2003, p.51). 
Reconciliation is most likely to be successful if it is both a vertical and 
horizontal process (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p.66). ICTR and gacaca should 
complement each other and in order to have a both horizontal and vertical process: 
gacaca and ingando both are supposed to be grass root processes and horizontal, 
and ICTR is vertical. However, neither gacaca nor ingando are truly horizontal 
because they both get strict orders from above. 
In short, neither gacaca nor ICTR are unproblematic institutions, but despite 
their shortcomings; they are the reasonably good at conducting reconciliation and 
therefore reasonably good at decreasing ethnic tensions in Rwanda. 
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6 Conclusion 
Firstly, I am going to present political impact on reconciliation; and secondly I am 
going to present how jurisdiction contributed to reconciliation, but first a short 
summary of the study is presented.   
Shortly, this essay has examined how the reconciliation process has affected 
ethnic tensions in Rwanda. Political influence and jurisdiction are two fators that 
have been studied more closely. Rwanda is a least-likely case, and therefore one 
could suppose that any conclusions drawn on the Rwandan case might apply to 
other cases. In Rwanda, ethnic divisions are a particularly difficult issue, because 
the colonizers had an important role in producing the tensions, by creating the 
strict boarders between the groups (Ingelaere, 2008, p.26). Reconciliation and 
possible forgiveness is difficult to achieve unless there are legitimate groups that 
can perform this task. The denial of ethnic identities from the regime could, 
hence, be problematic. 
The paradox of Rwandan politicians’ double standard concerning ethnicity is a 
worrying sign; RPF tries to abolish the idea different ethnic groups in Rwanda, 
but at the same time RPF uses the genocide as a source of legitimacy. 
Unavoidably, this puts the genocide in focus which could increase ethnic tensions, 
because it is dangerous if politicians present a view too distant from that of the 
people, even if they are not a democratic regime. The political elite can, therefore, 
prevent decline of ethnic tensions in a longer perspective. Undoubtedly, the 
opposite is also problematic, i.e. if the politicians were to officially emphasize the 
importance of ethnicity. A golden middle way seems to as usually be the only 
reasonable approach to this issue. To abolish ethnic divisions in Rwanda is bold 
decision, and could be very progressive under other circumstances; i.e. had it been 
attempted after the reconciliation process. However, when implemented in this 
period of time; when mass graves are still found, and the people obviously have a 
much different point of view than the politicians; it is not bold, but very 
unrealistic. Not even ingando camps are likely to change that. Nonetheless, the 
1959 rebellion and RPF’s gaining power indicate that the power structure is not 
static, but it seems to be very difficult to abolish the ethnic dimensions of politics 
all together. Thus; political impact could be both positive and negative. 
Reconciliation through justice is not a bad idea in a country where the people 
were desperate for it after those 100 days of genocide and many more of intra-
state war and uncertainty. However, this study shows that there are problems with 
how justice is carried out. While perhaps being the only pragmatic solution; 
gacaca courts, in some cases, seem to increase tensions between Hutu and Tutsi. 
The ICTR is a reasonably good institution for performing justice to those who 
organized the genocide, because there is a great risk that they would not get a fair 
trial in Rwanda. Problematic with the ICTR, however, is that the Rwandan people 
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are not participating in bringing justice to those who brought all the people 
calamity and death. The result of this study implies that ICTR tries to contribute 
to decreasing ethnic tensions by symbolically showing that genocide is not 
acceptable, and moreover by clarifying the truth of what really happened. 
Jurisdiction, likewise political impact, could also have positive or negative impact 
on declining ethnic tensions. 
As noted in 2.2: ‘although it is not “possible to complete the transition 
to…peace and stability by dwelling forever on … the past, neither is it possible to 
create a beginning without taking account of, and addressing, its legacies”’ 
(Carins et al, 2005, pp.472-3). For Rwanda, nothing could be truer: the country 
needs to deal with ethnic tensions, in a reasonable pace. 
It is important not to forget Rwanda’s colonial heritage; tensions between the 
ethnic groups have a long history. When reconciliation in Rwanda is discussed; 
Hutu and Tutsi are usually discussed, but Twa is often forgotten. Reconciliation 
for them is also important, though they only consist of 1% of Rwanda’s 
population; they were also killed and harassed in the genocide. Further, the long 
history of oppression of the Tutsis is also important; the Tutsi elite are unlikely to 
let go of power due to their remembrance oppression. 
Moreover, Rwanda today is not heaven nor hell, but rather an extremely poor 
authoritarian country that it struggling with its past. There are examples of victims 
who have forgiven those who killed their family (see e.g. UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008). There is hardly any need to mention 
the importance of adopting a long perspective; reconciliation is a process, and it 
will take years, if not generations to complete and not be finished with the trials of 
the ICTR or gacaca (Jeong, 2005, p.29). 
To sum it up, Kofi Annan’s speech that begun this essay seem to contain some 
truth. Though he is probably too overtly optimistic; there is a point in the 
suggestion (Annan, 1998, speech on ICTR homepage): 
 
‘I am sure that I speak for the entire international community when I express the 
hope that this judgement will contribute to the long-term process of national 
reconciliation in Rwanda.’ 
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